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Richard Creath (2007, 332) claimed earlier that “Quine did arrive in Vienna in 1932, 
but intellectually, at least, he never left. […] Vienna remained the city of Quine’s 
dreams; it was the home of his concerns, the source of his arguments, and the lode-
star of his aspirations.” If Vienna was the city of Quine’s dreams, then it was indeed 
the city of Rudolf Carnap.
According to the usual story, after Carnap arrived in Vienna in 1926 (first in 1925 
to present the Aufbau as his Habilitationsschrift), he found himself in a stimulating 
and cooperative atmosphere. For Carnap, originally a physicist, who tried to expli-
cate the connections between physics, mathematics, logic, and philosophy while 
searching for a general and unified scientific framework, Vienna offered the required 
help both to finish his ongoing projects and to conceptualize the further scientific- 
philosophical works.
Even the Vienna Circle welcomed Carnap as the long-awaited system-builder 
who could synthesize their various efforts and philosophical insights into a general 
framework which would connect all the dots. As Philipp Frank (1949, 33) put it: 
“[In the Aufbau] the integration of Mach and Poincaré was actually performed in a 
coherent system of conspicuous logical simplicity. Our Viennese group saw in 
Carnap’s work the synthesis that we had advocated for many years.” But even if we 
do not take at face value the retrospective – and as Thomas Uebel (2003) said – 
highly “programmatic” historiography of Frank, already in 1929 the authors of the 
Circle’s manifesto (Carnap, Neurath, and partly Hahn, Feigl and Waismann) claimed 
that (in the context of their method):
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[i]f such an analysis were carried through for all concepts, they would thus be ordered into 
a reductive system, a ‘constitutive system’. Investigations towards such a constitutive sys-
tem, the ‘constitutive theory’, thus form the framework within which logical analysis is 
applied by the scientific world-conception. (Carnap et al. 1929/1973, 309. Italics added.)
Thus before Neurath’s critique and Carnap’s physicalist turn, a part of the Circle 
maintained that Carnap’s general ideas about concept-building (in the Aufbau) pro-
vided the required framework to spell out their (scientific) conception of the world.
Vienna seemed to be, however, the city of Carnap’s dream from a broader cul-
tural perspective too. The manifesto’s authors (among them Carnap) said that
[i]n the second half of the nineteenth century, liberalism was long the dominant political 
current. Its world of ideas stems from the enlightenment, from empiricism, utilitarianism 
and the free trade movement of England. In Vienna’s liberal movement, scholars of world 
renown occupied leading positions. Here an anti-metaphysical spirit was cultivated […]. 
(Carnap et al. 1929/1973, 301.)
Besides the diverse scientific landscape, Vienna showed a colorful picture of politi-
cal, social and cultural ideas. Even Carnap seems to confirm that Vienna was an 
ideal place for him after he visited the Circle for the very first time in 1925: 
“Besides[the philosophical atmosphere] Vienna is attractive too: a lot of cultures, a 
lot of international lives.”1
So far so good one could say, concerning, at least, the usual story. As a part of 
Carnap’s Nachlass, however, in his original and unpublished intellectual autobiog-
raphy written in the late 1950s for the Schilpp volume, Carnap draws our attention 
to a quite different narrative of his “Wiener Projekt”2:
After the war […] the same spirit was still alive [vivid] in the life of my newly founded 
family and in the relationships with friends. When I went to Vienna, however, the situation 
changed. I still preserved the same spirit in my personal attitude, but I missed it painfully in 
the social life with others. None of the members of the Vienna Circle had taken part in the 
Youth Movement, and I did not feel myself strong and productive enough to transform 
singlehandedly the group of friends into a living community, sharing the style of life which 
I wanted. Although I was able to play a leading role in the philosophical work of the group, 
I was unable to fulfill the task of a missionary or a prophet. Thus I often felt as perhaps a 
man might feel who has lived in a religious[ly] inspired community and then suddenly finds 
himself isolated in the Diaspora and not strong enough to convert the heathen. The same 
feeling I had in a still greater measure later in America, where the power of traditional social 
conventions is much stronger than it was in Vienna and where also the number of those who 
have at least sensed some dissatisfaction with the traditional forms of life is smaller than 
anywhere on the European continent. (Carnap 1957, [UCLA] Box 2, CM3, folder M-A5, 
pp. B35–B36.)
This passage is purported to show that even though Vienna could have been the city 
of Carnap’s dreams from a theoretical (philosophical and scientific) point of view,3 
1 Carnap to Reichenbach, March 10, 1925. ASP RC 102-64-11. All translations are mine.
2 The term is from Carnap’s letter to his father-in-law. It is dated just after Carnap went back to 
Wiesneck after his visit to Vienna, November 2, 1925. ASP RC 102-23-01.
3 As many scholars argue, even from a philosophical point of view, Vienna could not cover the 
whole interest of Carnap due to the anti-Kantian tendencies of Austrian philosophy. In 1933 
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from a broader cultural (social and political) perspective the Viennese people just 
missed something important and fundamental: none of them have taken part in the 
so-called German Youth Movement (GYM), the Jugendbewegung.
The role and lasting effect of GYM on Carnap’s thought and philosophy were 
emphasized recently, for example, by Gottfried Gabriel (2004), André Carus (2007a, 
b), Christian Damböck (2012) and Jacques Bouveresse (2012). The aim of this 
paper is to make some further comments on Carnap’s relation to the GYM, particu-
larly on the question of why was it omitted from his published intellectual 
autobiography?
I will proceed as follows. In Sect. 10.2 the Jugendbewegung is going to be dis-
cussed, particularly its effect on Carnap’s Weltanschauung. Then in Sect. 10.3 I will 
present some reasons which led finally to the decision to cut from the autobiography 
those passages which concerned the Jugendbewegung.
One could naturally raise the question whether such a micro-story about an omit-
ted chapter is important at all. Since I claim that (at least partly) the GYM’s effect 
could be detected both in the principle of tolerance and in Carnap’s general metaphi-
losophy, it indeed seems to be relevant to deal with the omitted passage and its 
context. On the other hand, since the GYM was not present in Carnap’s philosophy 
as a propositionally formulated piece of knowledge (he never refers to it as such), 
approaching the problem from the idea of worldviews gives us a proper framework. 
According to Wilhelm Dilthey (1968, 78), “the deepest root of Weltanschauung is 
in life itself” thus we shall reveal those socio-cultural moments which made possi-
ble and framed Carnap’s views. GYM was just such a moment. Furthermore, as 
Karl Mannheim (1921–22/1959, 45) formulated it, the analyzes of worldviews and 
cultural objects “embraces not merely cultural products endowed with traditional 
prestige, such as Art or Religion, but also manifestations of everyday life which 
usually pass unnoticed […]”, like participation in a movement.
10.2  The Jugendbewegung and Its Effect on Carnap’s 
Weltanschauung
In an interview (Haller and Rutte 1977, 27–28), Heinrich Neider, a former member 
of the Circle, remembered Carnap as follows:
[Carnap] was then [around World War I] an independent social democrat […], Carnap was 
never a communist. But he was nevertheless a radical socialist, even if it was not something 
you would have guessed when you saw him. He was a man unable of any outburst of affect, 
Carnap wrote a short intellectual autobiography to Marcel Boll, in which he said: “It is character-
istic of the recent German philosophical situation that as a German of the Reich [Reichsdeutscher] 
I found my field of activity [Tätigkeitsfeld] not in Germany but in Vienna and Prague […].” ASP 
RC 091-20-09. One could interpret this passage as Carnap tries to give voice to his dissatisfaction 
that he had to leave Germany (even though he has found himself in a fruitful and cooperative 
atmosphere among logical empiricist outside of Germany).
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from whom I have never heard an impolite or despising word and to whom any kind of 
fanaticism was alien. I considered him which such a reaction of incredulity, when he said: 
‘I, who was an independent at that time’, and I said: ‘I would absolutely not believe that of 
you’ and he answered to that by the following reflection: ‘There are many things you would 
not believe about me, I have also been there at the Hohe Meißner festival’.4
The “Hohe Meißner” is a mountain in Hesse, Germany, where Germans planned to 
celebrate the Battle of Leipzig against Napoleon. 1913 was the centenary and they 
organized a huge national-military-patriotic festival. On the 11th and 12th of 
October, 1913 the members of the GYM planned a huge counter-festival, with 4000 
participants from all over the country; different groups of the Movement were gath-
ering at the top of the mountain. One enthusiastic member and actually organizer of 
the counter-festival was Carnap.5
The GYM, whose first group was called the Wandervogel [birds of passage], 
began at the end of the nineteenth century in Berlin6: it was a “large-scale rebellion 
of well-off adolescents against the perceived conformism of their parents and teach-
ers to the rigid norms of the society into which students were being socialized” 
(Carus 2007a, 50). The main roots of the GYM could be found in German 
Romanticism but members of the GYM tried to revive some customs and habits also 
from medieval times: they arranged extensive and long ramblings in the country-
side, where they eat what they find and could make from the elements of nature.7 
They tried to get closer to the peasantry and master their lifestyle with all its naiveté 
and purity.
The latter characteristics were of the utmost importance for the participants. 
Members of the GYM abstained from the “bourgeois” vices and drugs, such as cof-
fee, tobacco, alcohol. As Quine (1971, xxiv) recalled later: “Carnap’s habits were 
already austere: no science after dinner, on pain of a sleepless night. No alcohol 
ever. No coffee.” So instead of the usual contemporary lifestyle or traditions from 
the city, these young people created their own habits and culture: they sang while 
the walked, slept under the open sky, danced and read poems.
4 Translated by Jacques Bouveresse (2012, 56).
5 Another participant was Hans Reichenbach with a delegation of the Freistudenten [Free Students] 
from Berlin. Earlier Reichenbach was also a member of the Wandervogel movement and later took 
an active part in the Freie Studentenschaft. See the memoir of Carl Landauer (1978). Reichenbach’s 
experiences in the GYM had a similar effect on his thought as on Carnap’s. Kamlah (2013) pro-
vides a detailed analysis of Reichenbach’s volitional conception of ethics and decisions regarding 
both philosophy and science. I am indebted to Thomas Uebel for calling my attention to the case 
of Reichenbach.
6 About the GYM see Laqueur (1962), Aufmuth (1979); Bias-Engels (1988) and Werner (2003).
7 As Laquer (1962, 15–16) said “[…] the early Wandervogel put itself into deliberate opposition to 
a society whose interest in nature was by and large limited to yearly visits to mountain or seaside 
resorts, with all their modern comforts. There was more to it, too. It was, or at any rate became, a 
somewhat inchoate revolt against authority.”
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Carnap was a member of the GYM’s local group in Jena, called Serakreis [Sera 
Circle]; it was organized by the famous publisher Eugen Diederichs.8 Actually, 
Carnap was present at the Hohe Meißner as one of the representatives and for some 
time leader of the Serakreis. He remembered the gatherings of the circle, especially 
its Festival of the Midsummer night as follows:
Influenced by Skandinavian customs, there were songs, dances, and plays. Diederichs read 
the Hymn to the Sun by St. Francis of Assisi, after sundown the big fire was lighted, encir-
cled by the large chain of singing boys and girls, and when the fire had burned down there 
came the jumping of the couples through the flames. Finally, when the large crows of guests 
had left, our own Circle remained at rest around the glowing embers, listening to a song or 
talking softly, until we fell asleep in the quiet night under the starry sky. (Carnap, 1957, 
[UCLA], Box 2, CM3, MA-5, p. B30.)
The aim of the movements was “to find a way of life which was genuine, sincere, 
and honest, in contrast to the fakes and frauds of traditional bourgeois life; a life, 
guided by the own conscience and the own standards of responsibility and not by 
the obsolete norms of tradition.”9 Though Carnap complained a lot about his mem-
ory10 and the autobiography is indeed inaccurate and sloppy at some points, his 
recollection about the GYM agrees with the original documentation of the move-
ment: “Free German Youth desires, of its own determination and under its own 
responsibility, to shape its life with inner authenticity [Wahrhaftigkeit]. It stands 
united for this inner freedom under all circumstances” (Messer 1924, 19–20).
It would be hard to overestimate the influence of the GYM on Carnap’s thought. 
In the unedited and unpublished intellectual autobiography, he even devoted a sec-
tion to these ideas, entitled as “Weltanschauung: Religion, enlightenment, youth 
movement” (B18). What he learned and acquired there is not a set of theoretical 
statements and doctrines, but a way and attitude towards life [Lebensgefühl], a form 
of life [Lebensform] and a certain worldview [Weltanschauung]. One could say 
with Dilthey (1968, 86) that worldviews are not the “products of thought.” A world-
view is, after all, such an a-logical, non-conceptual and non-structured totality of 
feelings and experiences which underline all the products of the human mind 
[Geist]. From such a viewpoint, “theoretical philosophy is neither the creator nor 
the principal vehicle of the Weltanschauung of an epoch; in reality, it is merely only 
one of the channels through which a global factor – to be conceived as transcending 
the various cultural fields, its emanations  – manifests itself” (Mannheim 1921–
22/1959, 38). Philosophical contents, considered as cultural products and philo-
sophical styles, are just expressions and documentations of worldviews.
Since worldviews are pre-propositional, they are evidently having a non- 
theoretical character; but they are not irrational if we mean by the concept some-
thing meaningless. Worldviews are rather a-theoretical (and/or a-rational) complexes 
of feelings and experiences, hence rational justification is not required in their case: 
8 Didereichs was an important figure later too: as a publisher he published the books of Franz Roh, 
Wilhelm Flitner and Walter Fränzel, who were close collaborators of Carnap in the early 1920s.
9 Carnap, 1957, [UCLA], Box 2, CM3, MA-5, p. B31–B32.
10 See for example his letter to Brian McGuinnes, November 27, 1969. ASP RC 027-33-14.
10 Carnap’s Weltanschauung and the Jugendbewegung: The Story of an Omitted…
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worldviews do not violate the rules and norms of rationality since they serve as the 
hidden, but the continuous base of rationality and theoretical argumentation.11
Though Carnap is evidently not referring to what has been said earlier, one could 
still interpret his words as claiming that the suitable cultural medium and social 
experiences could influence philosophy itself in a fruitful manner, which is, as 
Mannheim (1921–22/1959, 38) said, “merely one of [the] manifestations [of world-
views] and not the only one”:
For those whose work is on a purely theoretical nature, there is the danger of a too narrow 
concentration on the intellectual side of life, so that the properly human side may be 
neglected. I think it was very fortunate for my personal development during these decisive 
years that I could participate both in Freiburg and in Jena in the common life of such fine 
and inspired groups of the Youth Movement. (Carnap, 1957, [UCLA], Box 2, CM3, MA-5, 
p. B32.)
Though Carnap participated in the GYM only between 1910 and 1914, he actively 
maintained his relation to his fellows during and after the First World War.12 He 
continuously corresponded with the members, read their pamphlets and articles 
which were published in their journals. His friendships made in the movement 
turned out to be lasting for decades and in some cases, they were life-long relations. 
Carnap got to know the German sociologist Hans Freyer in the GYM, and Freyer’s 
ideas about the Geisteswissenschaften became very influential on the Aufbau and 
Freyer played an important role in transmitting the philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey 
in the formative years of Carnap.13 After the First World War, Carnap organized a 
workshop in Buchenbach about the “system of sciences”: the participants were his 
closest friends from the Serakreis, namely Freyer, the pedagogic Wilhelm Flitner, 
and the art historian and photographer Franz Roh. The discussion group of Carnap, 
Freyer, Roh and Flitner in the summer of 1920 had a well-documented effect on the 
Aufbau and on the early thoughts of Carnap.14
All these friends shared the same experiences in the GYM and the movement’s 
impact remained quite detectable and fundamentally important for Carnap:
11 According to Tamás Demeter (2012, 49), worldviews could be approached as a form of Kantian 
conditions of possibility, especially like the forms of intuition. Neither of them have a conceptual 
character, they do not mean knowledge, they do not possess a propositional structure but they still 
make possible knowledge in a broader sense: “[w]e could say in the Kantian idiom, Weltanschauung 
is empirically real but transcendentally ideal: works of cultural production are impossible indepen-
dently of a worldview, but a worldview cannot be known independently of the works of cultural 
production.”
12 Actually Carnap received two letters from Martha Hörmann, a former member of the Serakreis, 
in 1964. She told Carnap about the 1963 meeting at the Hohe Meißner, and how it revived her feel-
ings and memories from the formative years in Jena. See ASP AC 027-29-26 and ASP RC 
027-29-27.
13 About Dilthey’s indirect influence on Carnap’s thought see Gabriel (2004); Damböck (2012); 
Tuboly (forthcoming).
14 Freyer and Flitner were also members of the GYM and while Carnap’s friendship with Freyer 
broke in the early 1930s when Freyer moved to the political right, Flitner, Roh and Carnap were 
life-long friends. About the Buchenbach-conference see Dahms (2016), about Flitner’s recollec-
tion see Flitner (1986).
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[…] the spirit that lived in this movement, which was like a religion without dogmas, 
remained a precious inheritance for everyone who had the good luck to take an active part 
in it. What remained was more than a mere reminiscence of an enjoyable time; it was rather 
an indestructible living strength which forever would influence one’s reactions to all practi-
cal problems of life. (Carnap, 1957, [UCLA], Box 2, CM3, MA-5, p. B34–B35.)
What Carnap learned is a certain attitude: we should not accept blindly any doc-
trine, knowledge and the heritage of our ancestors and other authorities just as it 
stand. We have the right and ability to revise everything, to reshape and rebuild 
(Aufbau) our material, cultural and social environment and to question every con-
vention and arrange our cultural world as we wish. We have a total freedom [völlige 
freiheit]15 in these questions. Carnap formulated these ideas in his published autobi-
ography under the label of “scientific humanism”:
[…] man has no supernatural protectors or enemies and that therefore whatever can be done 
to improve life is the task of man himself. […] we had the conviction that mankind is able 
to change the conditions of life in such a way that many of the sufferings of today may be 
avoided and that the external and the internal situation of life for the individual, the com-
munity, and finally for humanity will be essentially improved. (Carnap 1963, 83)
In his unpublished autobiography, actually, he told a story about a conversation with 
a peasant in a remote village of the Black Forest after the First World War which 
documents the above-mentioned trends:
We looked at an airplane at great distance, high in the sky, and he said: ‘They say that some-
times people fly in such machines. But that is not possible.’ I told him that I had flown a few 
times in an airplane. He looked at me somewhat suspiciously, shook his head, and said: 
‘Now look here: I am much older than you; I know very well what can be done and what 
cannot. Now you believe me, this thing is just not possible.’ (Carnap 1957, [UCLA], Box 2, 
CM3, MA-4, pp. N17–N18.)
This example shows quite well that attitude against which Carnap and his youth 
friends stood up.
I would like to end this section with the mentioning of the examples where one 
can evidently find the effect of the GYM on Carnap’s thought. First there is the 
notorious principle of tolerance (Carnap 1934/1937, §17), which says, after all, that 
one is totally free to choose between logical systems and (philosophical/scientific) 
languages as he wishes (though the principle was extendable for methods also). 
Engineer your schemes and conceptions as you wish, decide which one fits your 
space of (practical and theoretical) reasons the best and leave behind the authorita-
tive a priori/armchair-style philosophical reasoning.
The second point (which is actually connected to the first) is that our freedom is 
extended also to the practical realm through the dialectical conception of explica-
tion (Carus 2007a): since the possible consequences of the various possible acts 
affect our practices and these consequences are codified in different language forms, 
our actions and practical decisions are not fixed but relative in a sense to a particular 
language form. This conception was formulated compactly by Richard Jeffrey 
15 Carnap used these words when he introduced his principle of tolerance in the discussions of the 
Circle in 1933. See ASP RC 110-07-22.
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(1994, 847) who was a close collaborator of Carnap on the theories of probability 
and inductive logic in the last few decades of his life:
Philosophically, Carnap was a social democrat; his ideals were those of the enlightenment. 
His persistent, central idea was: »It’s high time we took charge of our own mental lives«, 
time to engineer our own conceptual scheme (language, theories) as best we can to serve 
our own purposes; […] time to accept the fact that there’s nobody out there but us, to choose 
our purposes and concepts to serve those purposes, if indeed we are to choose those things 
and not simply suffer them. […] For Carnap, deliberate choice of the syntax and semantics 
of our language was more than a possibility it was a duty we owe ourselves as a corollary 
of freedom.
If the GYM had such a detectable and important influence on Carnap’s intellectual 
development as claimed here, then one could rightly ask that why did he cut it from 
his intellectual autobiography? I will try to indicate some possible reasons in the 
next section.
10.3  The “Intimate” Parts of the Biography
In the recent literature on Carnap, it is frequently emphasized that his original intel-
lectual autobiography written for the Schilpp volume in the second half of the 1950s 
was much longer and detailed than the published one in 1963.16 Carnap cut his 
autobiography but there were certain shortenings also in his replies and systematic 
presentations of his philosophical ideas. So far Carnap-scholars did not focus on the 
reasons for this move besides that it was due to the unexpected length of the volume 
which, at some point, was considered to be published in two volumes just because 
of that.
Carnap’s unpublished correspondence, however, is promising in this context and 
I will concentrate on three points. These points (or reasons) have in a general (and 
neutral) sense suitable documentary-value: they express aptly Carnap’s worldview, 
the idea that the fallible and contingent factors of “everyday life” could bear on 
theoretical issues, and the trends of the social and political epoch of his time.
In a broader sense, we could connect these points and Mannheim’s (1921–
22/1959, 44) inquiries about the “strata of meaning” of the cultural and social prod-
ucts. Mannheim claims that we can differentiate three levels: (a) the objective 
meaning, (b) the intentional-expressive meaning, and the (c) documentary or evi-
dential meaning. In the first case, to understand a given act, we shall abstract from 
the participant subjects, from their intentions and psychological states, and it is 
16 It seems, in fact, that the Schilpp volume, The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, did not appear in 
1963. Carnap wrote to Robert Mathers on 20 November, 1963 that “I hear that the Schilpp volume 
is to appear by Dec. 31; but there have been so many delays that this date cannot be counted on” 
(ASP RC 088-62-09). Still on 5 April, 1964, Carnap told to Albert Blumberg that “Unfortunately 
I am not able to send you a copy of my autobiography. In the mistaken trust that the Schilpp-




enough to know the “objective social configuration” (ibid. p. 45). Only in a given 
social configuration will a bit of metal function as alms. In the second case, the 
subject will be relevant and the meaning of the act “cannot be divorced from the 
subject and his actual stream of experience, but acquires its fully individualized 
content only with reference to this ‘intimate’ universe” (ibid. p. 46). What matters 
is what the subject intends to express with the given act. Finally, in the third case, 
besides the social configurations, and the intended expressive elements, the impor-
tant thing is “what is documented about [the subject], albeit unintentionally, by that 
act of his” (ibid. p. 47).
Given that Carnap’s act, namely the cutting of the passages about the GYM, 
could be considered as a cultural and social product of the human mind [Geist], we 
could use Mannheim’s approach. Actually Carnap’s unpublished correspondence, 
mainly with Feigl and Hempel, is very promising and it indeed indicates some par-
tial answers. I will concentrate on three separate points.
Carnap finished the first drafts of his intellectual autobiography in December 
1956, and he sent it directly to Feigl and Hempel. He was “very dissatisfied with it” 
and as he said in the letter “you two are those from whom I can get the best help for 
the later working on.”17 As usual, Carnap was wondering about the “historical cor-
rectness” of his memory and asked his friends to think about “factual events but also 
about influences by books or persons on [his] conceptions or about anything else 
[…]” (ASP CH 11-02-10).
Hempel replied on January 14, 1957, and claimed that “it is an utterly fascinating 
piece, which will show [Carnap] to [his] readers from a side they never thought 
existed” (ASP CH 11-02-09). Hempel also suggested particular places where 
Carnap could shorten his autobiography. Interestingly in the light of his later 
remarks regarding the cutting, Hempel suggested omitting (among others) the parts 
about the Jugendbewegung.
Carnap was still bothering with the shortenings in April 1957, when his wife, Ina 
wrote to Hempel (who was called by his personal acquaintances as “Peter”):
I wish, Peter, you would let me have a line taking issue with the following; if cuts are to be 
made (Feigl, Bohnert say: “no cuts, if possible”; I don’t agree), where would your cutting 
emphasis lie? Mia says: on the content of publications as given by Carnap, since people can 
read them anyway. (Ina to Hempel, ASP RC 102-13-59.)18
Though at first Ina said that she “like[d] just this [suggestion] very well”, after all, 
she had a different move in mind and did not agree with the advice that Carnap 
should cut the survey of his publications.19 Instead, she claimed that “I should like 
17 Carnap to Hempel and Feigl, ASP CH 11-02-10. The letter is dated in Carnap’s Nachlass as 
November 18, 1956 (ASP RC 091-20-18), but it was received by Hempel on December 5.
18 The letter could be found also in Hempel’s Nachlass, see ASP CH 11-02-07. “Mia” is Hans 
Reichenbach’s wife, Maria Reichenbach.
19 It would have been indeed optional for Carnap though given that Ayer’s collection of Logical 
Positivism was just on his way (it was published in 1959) and he provided some fresh remarks 
about his recently translated papers. The University of California Press editor Robert Y. Zachary 
asked Quine’s opinion about a possible translation of Carnap’s Aufbau in 1961 (see Creath 1990, 
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to see cuts made in the more intimate material (childhood, youth movement, own 
children, auxiliary languages), and make it more an ‘intellectual’ auto.”20 What does 
this passage tell us?
It seems that by an intellectual autobiography Ina indeed meant an intellectual 
autobiography where the emphasis lies on the evolution of Carnap’s theses, claims 
and results. An intellectual autobiography should not deal with the personal back-
ground and historical contexts beyond what is necessary for such a literary genre. 
The “intimate” parts and the personal experiences just do not add anything to the 
content of the philosophical claims. Presumably, it was Ina who formulated exactly 
this idea in a letter to Feigl:
This morning I mailed you the first half of the autobiography. Don’t be shocked about the 
length. Much of it is very easy reading. The part which impresses me more is always where 
it is not so easy reading, but then that may be my peculiarity. Before my eyes is the little 
book which Freud wrote as his autobiography, and which I think extremely good as an intel-
lectual autobiography: a minimum of personal facts and a maximum about the develop[ment] 
and spread of the ideas, actually a history of psychoanalysis. To me this seems the ideal way 
of writing such a thing: people at large somehow do not seem worth the personal details, but 
should be fed facts primarily. Says I. (Ina/Carnap to Feigl, December 5, 1956. ASP RC 
102-07-34.)
This could be justified even in the theoretical framework of Carnap and that’s 
could be one reason why did Carnap indeed cut off the mentioned “intimate” pas-
sages. Carnap always distinguished theoretical/philosophical claims and one’s atti-
tude toward life (Lebensgefühl) and worldview (Weltanschauung). The latter 
underlies the former as non-theoretical complexes of cultural and social experiences 
along with the inherited bag of values. That was just the main point of his critic in 
1932 (in the “Überwindung” article) when he claimed that though metaphysics 
could exhibit some positive role – namely to express one’s Lebensgefühl – it is not 
a theoretical one.
Since the relevant passages  – which contained the memories about the 
Jugendbewegung – were entitled by Carnap as “Weltanschauung: Religion, enlight-
enment, youth movement” he indeed seemed to identify these reflections as the 
background basis for his philosophy and not as parts of his theoretical consider-
ations. As such, Carnap held that though the remarks about one’s Lebensgefühl and 
Weltanschauung could be useful to understand the (often irrational or better, 
a- theoretical) reasons behind one’s philosophy, they are useless in the evaluation of 
proposed arguments. In a frequently quoted passage from Carnap’s intellectual 
autobiography – where he recalled the role and effect of Herman Nohl – he claimed 
that
453–454). Given that, Carnap could have known that another important book of his will be avail-
able to the English speaking world. Later on the 10th of June, 1969 Carnap wrote to Ferenc 
Altrichter (who was editing the selected Hungarian translations of Carnap) that “I think it will not 
be necessary for me to write new comments on these papers indicating my present views and how 
they differ from the formulations in these old papers. I made such comments at an earlier time.” 
Listing these places Carnap did not mention his Schilpp volume. See ASP RC 027-22-01.
20 Ina to Hempel, April 15, 1957. ASP RC 102-13-59.
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[m]y friends and I were particularly attracted by Nohl because he took a personal interest in 
the lives and thoughts of his students, in contrast to most of the professors in Germany at 
that time, and because in his seminars and in private talks he tried to give us a deeper under-
standing of philosophers on the basis of their attitude toward life (“Lebensgefühl”) and their 
cultural background. (Carnap 1963, 4.Cf. Carnap 1957, [UCLA], Box 2, CM3, M-A3, p. 
B3.)
In the unpublished version, however, this passage continues with the following 
rarely cited remark:
[…] since my interest was more systematically than historically oriented, I was frustrated 
when he [Nohl] pushed aside questions about the correctness of the views of a philosopher 
whose work we studied. Following his teacher Dilthey, he regarded as the main aim of 
philosophical study not the solution of problems, but the understanding of the ways of 
thinking of the various philosophers. (Carnap 1957, [UCLA], Box 2, CM3, M-A3, pp. 
B3-B4.)
This also seems to suggest that for Carnap, writing a mainly intellectual autobiog-
raphy means that one should omit the elements of his Weltanschauung.
From this angle, we could explore the objective meaning of Carnap’s act – though 
what is relevant is not the objective social configuration but the objective philo-
sophical configuration. Carnap’s act – namely to remove certain typewritten pages 
from a document – in a given theoretical medium become bearer of a philosophical 
meaning: it will be the manifestation of the idea to distinguish factual/cognitive and 
non-factual/non-cognitive elements. If one knows the relevant and particular philo-
sophical stance in question and all of its commitments, then the given act of cutting 
the parts about worldviews (which are non-theoretical, hence non-intellectual) from 
an intellectual autobiography will be meaningful. From this point of view, it does 
not matter that we are talking about Carnap, Hempel, Reichenbach or any other 
philosopher who puts more weight on the theoretical side: what matters is that a 
certain act (or product) will acquire its meaning in a given objective philosophical 
configuration.
We could also point out that Carnap was just simply not interested in writing the 
autobiography and cutting the least intellectual and theoretical parts which were not 
known in the U.S. (as the Jugendbewegung) just seemed to be the most simplest 
move to get over the project.21
Carnap started to work on his autobiography in 1954; in fact, it turned out to be 
just a duty to him which he wanted to “avoid.”22 After all, he wrote in 1960 that 
“Schilpp has just sent the mss. for the Carnap-volume to the printer – perhaps it will 
then appear in 1961. I spent an inordinate amount of time on the writing of the 
‘Intellectual Autobiography’, I don’t do this sort of thing too well. The technical 
discussions are much more my sort of writing […].”23
21 Since every other autobiography of the Schilpp volumes starts with the author’s childhood it 
would have been unreasonable to delete the relatively long passages about his childhood and his 
mother.
22 Carnap to Feigl, June 14. 1954. ASP RC 102-08-43.
23 Carnap to Vere Chapell, August 4, 1960. ASP RC 027-03-17.
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When he was working on the intellectual autobiography, Carnap was indeed in a 
project with a lot of technicalities: it was the theory of probability which was his 
“latest and in his eyes most valuable baby” on which he was working for 30 years.24 
Due to the regular and increasingly grievous pains in his back, Carnap was con-
cerned from time to time about the prospects of his life.25 Since there was still a lot 
to do with probability, the writing and shortening of the autobiography were just a 
liability. In 1956, during the composition of the manuscripts, Carnap fulminated as 
follows: “For heaven’s sake, a logician should not be asked to write a history or an 
autobiography, unless he is a genius like Russell!”26 Later, in 1958, he was still quite 
desperate: “I am engaged in the somewhat tedious work of working over my ms. for 
the Schilpp volume; I shall be much relieved once this manuscript is off my hands 
and I can return to inductive logic.”27
Even though Carnap had to work also on the replies, the autobiography was a 
“bigger chore than the former.”28 Anyways, if Carnap would have the required time, 
his memory would function just good as he wished, and he would have enough 
space for his autobiography, writing that sort of thing would have been still a huge 
challenge to him. In 1965, he asked Hempel to help him formulate a preface to his 
Philosophical Foundations of Physics (second edition as Introduction to the 
Philosophy of Science). He said: “You know, I am rather clumsy in formulating such 
things, where the non-cognitive meaning components are more important than the 
cognitive ones.”29 The relevant parts of the autobiography, however, were just filled 
with such non-cognitive passages which could not be formulated in a technical way 
because they formed the basis for all the theoretical projects of Carnap.
Again judging things from this perspective, cutting all the “intimate” parts was 
just the quickest move to get over the autobiography and move back to the technical 
projects. Carnap’s correspondence documents quite well that while Schilpp insisted 
aggressively that he should write first the autobiography, he always tried to delay the 
24 Carnap/Ina to Hempel, August 31, 1957. ASP RC 102-13-55. According to the unpublished parts 
of his autobiography Carnap started to work on the questions of probability between 1941 and 
1944. See Carnap 1957, [UCLA] Box 2, CM3, folder M-A5, p. P20.
25 See for example Carnap’s letter to Bochenski (October 30, 1963) where he was wondering about 
“how much time one has left […].” ASP RC 027-23-40.
26 Carnap to Hempel and Feigl, November 28, 1956. ASP CH 11-02-10.
27 Carnap to Richard Martin, May 1, 1958, ASP RC 081-12-13. Carnap wrote to Feigl already on 
the 4th of February, 1955 that “the Schilpp volume is taken far more of my time than I can spare 
from my work on probability […].” ASP RC 102-08-26. The same motive occurs in many other 
letters see e.g. ASP RC 102-08-01; ASP RC 102-07-39; but Carnap complained about it also to 
Hugues Leblanc, ASP RC 081-10-03.
28 Carnap to Howard Stein, August 11, 1954. ASP RC 090-13-26.
29 Carnap to Hempel, November 24, 1965, ASP RC 102-13-05. When Carnap wrote the preface to 
Logische Syntax der Sprache, Neurath helped him with some ‘nice’ formulations. See Neurath’s 
letter to Carnap, June, 10. 1934. ASP RC 029-10-65.
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task: “I have, of course, not only unconscious but also quite conscious resistance 
against the writing of the autobiography […].”30
One could plausibly claim that omitting the “intimate” parts of the autobiogra-
phy (and even some first-orderly philosophical parts) set back Carnap’s historical 
rehabilitation for many years. Hempel was very much aware of the problem when 
he wrote to Ina (after she suggested cutting the personal passages):
Would we not be shocked if there were an autobiography of Kant which had been cut down 
just to save on publication costs? I sympathize with the feeling and think and you should try 
how much Schilpp will allow; but I think that some cutting is possible where repetitions or 
extremely leisurely reflections occur […]. As for Ina vs. Maria Rbch concerning where the 
cuts should be made if further reductions are inevitable: On the whole I would agree with 
Maria Rbch. I think that most of the people who are really interested in the volume will 
have read a good deal of Carnap’s work or will be willing to look into it; and at any rate, 
those publications are there and available for posterity; but the material about the human 
side is not available elsewhere and will surely arouse a great deal of interest. (Hempel to 
Carnap/Ina, May 18, 1957, ASP RC 102-13-57.)
Things were settled, however, and a few years later the intellectual autobiography 
appeared just as we know it today. Considering things like this, it will matter that we 
are talking about Carnap: it was Carnap himself, who expressed with his act a cer-
tain meaning, namely the intention of avoiding to write an autobiography. It is more 
than just the fact that a certain theoretical/philosophical commitment surfaces in 
practice: a certain ‘higher strata’ of meaning is also expressed here intentionally. It 
is the way how we authentically grasp the conveyed meaning: “just as it was meant 
by the subject, just as it appeared to him when his consciousness was focused upon 
it” (Mannheim 1921–22/1959, 46).
The final reason – which I will just mention because it was treated in quite a 
detailed manner by George Reisch (2005, 2007) – is connected to the political atmo-
sphere of the United States just before and after the Second World War. When 
Carnap immigrated finally to the U.S. in 1935, he found himself in a wholly differ-
ent cultural and political context that he experienced earlier in Germany and later in 
Austria (or in Czechoslovakia). In 1935 (just before he left Europe) Carnap was 
about to hold a lecture tour in the U.S., especially at the New York University. Nagel 
was preparing the invitation and he wrote to Sidney Hook to arrange it; later Nagel 
quoted to Carnap some parts of Hook’s letter with his own commentaries:
»Tell Carnap that Universities throughout the U.S are becoming politically more reaction-
ary daily and to exclude from his prospectus anything which some dumb conservative – 
who ‘feel’ these things – might regard as cultural Bolshevism. I wish I could get him to 
NYU for a year, but it doesn’t seem possible now and we couldn’t pay him enough […].« 
In the light of these remarks, perhaps it would be wiser if you replaced the lecture on the 
relation between contemporary philosophy and culture by something less full of dynamite. 
(Nagel to Carnap, January 5, 1935. ASP RC 029-05-16.)31
30 Carnap to Feigl, November, 14. 1955. ASP RC 102-08-06. On Schilpp’s forceful letters see the 
correspondence of Carnap and Feigl, ASP RC 102-08-07 and ASP RC 102-08-09.
31 In turn Ina replied that “[t]hough the chance of a longer stay there is very little, Carnap is glad 
that H. knows about him and is also grateful for the advice not to show apparently that he is a 
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The situation just got worse after the Second World War under the McCarthy-area 
and so Carnap had to rethink and stow his European socialist and political sensitiv-
ity away. As Reisch (2005) showed in his sociology of science book with great clar-
ity, there was only one way to uphold Carnap’s admitted professionalism and 
significance: he had to fall back to the “icy slopes of logic” (Carnap et al. 1929/1973, 
317).
If even the mentioning of the relation between culture and philosophy by an 
allegedly East-European socialist in the mid-1930s was just so dangerous and trig-
gered the concept of “cultural Bolshevism”, some parts of his intellectual autobiog-
raphy could cause a certain philosophical and cultural trauma in the philosophy 
departments.32 The earlier phases of the a-political Jugendbewegung and the later 
political phases was uniquely German and considering the fact some members of 
the movement ended up in either communist or Nazi groups could not help the care-
fully constructed politically-neutral picture of Carnap. From this perspective, cut-
ting the “intimate” parts of the autobiography was perhaps the right move to shorten 
the manuscripts.
Though Carnap did not even mention or referred to the political atmosphere of 
the United States, or that he had in mind such reasons to cut the “intimate parts”, at 
this point we are facing the third “strata of meaning”, i.e. the documentary-meaning 
in the Mannheimean sense. Even if Carnap’s act points to theoretical commitments, 
and even if he evidently expressed his disinterest in the autobiography, cutting the 
politically (possibly) sensitive parts ‘unintentionally’ documents certain trends and 
the socio-political environment of the 1950s and 1960s.
As Peter Galison (1996, 35) wrote, “[…] people move across oceans with rela-
tive ease, complexes of ideas do not.” If Carnap would and could publish his intel-
lectual autobiography as he first imagined and wrote it (i.e. if he could ‘move’ his 
own Jugendbeweger past officially), then perhaps he could have helped the under-
standing of his ideas and that socio-cultural environment which gave rise to his 
informal and even technical philosophy.
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